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Abstract
We investigate the time allocation decisions by South African learners using the South African Time
Use Survey. We show that punctuality appears to be a problem with around 20% of all learners seeming
to arrive late. Punctuality and absenteeism seem to be problems disproportionately among poor learners.
Overall time devoted to schooling and homework does not show a consistent income gradient. Poor
learners, however, spend considerable time each day on chores. The distribution of this additional work
falls disproportionately on girls.
Some of the ﬁndings can be easily explained in terms of a simple human capital production frame-
work, but some of the social constraints seem to require a broader framework in which choices by some
individuals create externalities for others.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The relationship between education and long-run economic growth is among the more established empirical
regularities. While there is no doubt that more aﬄuent societies can also aﬀord better quality education, it
seems equally clear that a properly skilled workforce is one of the major determinants of economic perfor-
mance. This relationship seems to hold both at the level of countries, as well as regions within a country
(Glaeser and Saiz 2003). At the individual level, the importance of education for access to employment and
the level of remuneration is well documented (Card 1999). The literature suggests that the social returns to
education may be higher than the private ones (Psacharopoulos 1994), but there is little doubt that there
are ample private incentives for acquiring education.
Several authors have recently investigated the relationship between school quality and educational out-
comes in South Africa (Case and Deaton 1999, Case and Yogo 1999, Anderson, Case and Lam 2001, Crouch
and Mabogoane 2001). These contributions have investigated how characteristics of the schools or of the
parents impact on the outcomes of their children. The role of the learners in this process has thus far not
been scrutinised. This seems to be an important lacuna given the fact that learners are not simply passive
recipients of decisions made by others. This paper is intended to be a ﬁrst, largely descriptive, foray into the
terrain of the students’ educational choices. The vehicle for investigating these issues is the South African
Time Use Survey (Budlender, Chobokoane and Mpetsheni 2001). We are able to investigate if and when
students arrive at school, how much time they devote to school and to home work. We are also able to show
what other demands there are on their time.
We will show that many students seem to arrive late or not at all. Many arrive without having eaten
breakfast. Girl students in particular have signiﬁcant domestic responsibilities. In some cases these seem
to become a constraint on home work. Boys seem to be able to engage in more structured leisure activities
than girls. We conclude that the choices that children make about school and home work seem to be made
under constraints emanating from the household and community expectations. Understanding these, and
the actual choices that students make might help when policy makers confront the question of what is needed
to improve educational outcomes. We will hazard a few suggestions at the end.
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1Although this paper is intended to be mainly descriptive, we anchor the discussion with a simple analytical
framework. That is provided in the next section. We use a simple Beckerian Human Capital framework
(Becker 1993) and sketch out what factors might aﬀect the time allocation decisions of children. We then
(in section 3) discuss the Time Use Survey from which our information is derived. We follow this with a
discussion of the determinants of school attendance in section 4. Section 5 presents a description of the
typical school day. This is subdivided into a discussion of the length of sleep (5.1), the process of getting
ready for school (5.2), the school day itself (5.3), home work (5.4) and other post-school activities (5.5). In
Section 6 we reﬂect on the empirical ﬁndings. We show that many of the ﬁndings can be reconciled with
the human capital framework. Nevertheless there also seem to be “spillover” eﬀects from choices made by
others which are less easy to accommodate in this framework. Section 7 concludes.
2 A simple analytical framework
We assume that human capital of the learner is created through a production function of the sort
HL = f (HT,t s,A L,y S) (1)
where HT is the human capital of the teacher, ts is the time spent by the learner at school and doing home
work, AL is the “innate” (genetic) ability of the learner and yS is the total amount of resources devoted to
t h ep r o c e s s .S o m eo ft h e s er e s o u r c e sm a yc o me from the state and some from the parents.
We assume that the learner maximises a utility function of the sort
U = U (I,tl)
where I is total life-time income and tl i sl e i s u r ec o n s u m p t i o n .W ea s s u m et h a t
I = wtw
where tw is the life-time labour supply and w = w(HL) is an increasing function of HL.W eo b s e r v et h a t
the time budget-constraint is given by
ts + tw + tl = t∗
where t∗ is the total supply of time. Note that we have abstracted away completely from the intertemporal
dynamics of this problem.
This static problem can be solved in the usual way. At an interior optimum (i.e. where ts,t l and tw are













These conditions have the obvious interpretation. Equation 2a states that the opportunity cost of an extra
unit of leisure (the left hand side) is equal to the utility that could have been gained from the wage foregone
(the right hand side). Equation 2b states that the beneﬁt of an additional unit of schooling is the change it
ultimately brings about in the wage cumulated over the entire working life of the individual (the left hand
side). This must be exactly oﬀset by the opportunity cost of that unit of schooling, which is the immediate
wage foregone (the right hand side).
Considering the last equation ﬁrst, we would expect to see lower allocation of times to schooling in
situations where the impact of schooling on the expected wage is reduced. In particular, if the impact of the
learner’s schooling eﬀort is strongly mediated by the teacher’s skill HT and the resources available within
the school yS, then we would expect students to quit the schooling system earlier if HT and yS are low.
Innate ability has the opposite eﬀect - an increase in AL should encourage individuals to stay on at school
longer. We should take note of this, since it potentially introduces a selection bias in some of the results to
2be reported below. Children in poor schools and schools with low teacher skill should on average have higher
ability than the children in better resourced and better quality schools.
This conclusion may be reversed if there are systematic diﬀerences in the wage schedules in diﬀerent parts
of the country. In places in which there is excess supply, i.e. low wage rates and high unemployment rates,
the opportunity cost of an additional year at school is reduced. In such places many more learners will stay
on at school. Equation 2a would lead us to expect much higher levels of leisure time in these contexts also.
Implicit in much of this discussion is the idea that from the learner’s perspective teacher quality, school
resources and the local labour market conditions are ﬁxed. This may not be true if students have a choice
of schools or if their parents can send them elsewhere. Indeed we know that there is some mobility among
school-age children in South Africa. Nevertheless the bulk of students will be geographically constrained.
Given the fact that there are strong spatial gradients in both teacher qualiﬁcations and community resources
treating HT and yS as exogenous is likely to be a reasonable approximation. High quality teachers and
schools operating in very poor environments exist, but they are not the norm.
The model assumes that the choice variables are continuous. Nevertheless some of the choices have
discrete elements to them. Schooling is organised in terms of the academic year and the enrolment decision
is intrinsically discrete. The actual time allocation decision conditional on being enrolled is, however, more
continuous. There are additional complications which arise from the fact that we observe the allocation
decisions at a particular point in time, rather than over the entire life span. If we observe someone who is
not in school we cannot deﬁnitively conclude that they have reached their desired level of schooling. They
may simply be taking some time oﬀ to deal with short run crises such as illnesses. In the case of home
work this is even clearer. To the extent to which students can allocate their overall learning time over the
week (perhaps even the year), their optimal allocation may be lumpy - involving heavy study times in some
periods and lighter ones in others. We will generally assume that such short-run deviations from the long-run
averages will tend to even out statistically over the entire population.
Even though the model is intended to reﬂect the long-run allocations we will also interpret some of the
short run choices in terms of it. For instance a short run increase in the disutility of studying1 should lead
to a short term decrease in the time allocated to school work. We will note below that there are seasonal
and day of week variations in the time dedicated to school work, which we will interpret in these terms.
3 The data
The source of our data is the Time Use Survey (Budlender et al. 2001) carried out by Statistics South Africa
in 2000. The information is based on recall diaries from about 14 000 individuals. The individuals were
selected in a three stage sampling process. In the the ﬁrst stage 902 primary sampling unit were selected
from a set of enumerator areas stratiﬁed by location, viz. urban formal, urban informal, commercial farming
and ex-homeland rural areas. The urban informal and commercial farming areas were oversampled at this
stage. In the second stage dwellings were sampled within these clusters and in the third two individuals
(if the household had two or more eligible individuals, otherwise one individual) were selected based on
a randomization procedure within the household. Only individuals aged ten above were eligible to be
interviewed. Clearly people from households with fewer adults were oversampled relative to people from
larger households. Statistics South Africa have provided a set of weights to correct for the diﬀerent sampling
probabilities. These weights are used in all the estimation procedures reported below.
In order to account for some seasonal and weekly variations in time use, the survey was collected in three
tranches: February, June and October. Within each tranche attempts were made to collect information
across the working week. Unlike with some other surveys, however, no attempt was made to interview the
same individual on more than one day. This means that we cannot investigate any day-to-day variation in
the choices made (e.g. in relation to home work).
The information was recorded through three diﬀerent instruments. Once the household had been selected
a household level questionnaire was administered to a knowledgeable person. This questionnaire included
some basic socio-economic information on the entire household, such as access to services and total house-
hold income. A roster of household members provided the basis from which to select the individuals to
1We can think of this as a short run increase in the utility of leisure.
3be interviewed further. The selected individuals were asked a set of questions about themselves, such as
educational attainment, marital status, labour market participation and personal income. The main focus
of the personal interviewers, however, was the time diary.
3.1 Measuring time allocation
Individuals were interviewed about their use of time during the previous twenty-four hours. The activities
were recorded within half-hour time slots according to an “activity classiﬁcation system”. Provision was
made for up to three activities in each slot. The Time Use Survey therefore broadly conforms to best
practice as outlined by Juster and Staﬀord (1991, p.243):
The methodology for collecting time allocation data has been well developed at this point,
and the main characteristics of optimum methodology are not in dispute. The only way in which
reliable data on time allocation have been obtained is by the use of time diaries, administered to
a sample of individuals in a population and organized in such a way as to provide a probability
sample of all types of days and of the diﬀerent seasons of the year. The time diaries are usually
retrospective — they ask respondents for a detailed chronology of the previous 24 hours, with
responses coded according to a standard list of activities
One of the questions that arises with a recall diary in the South African context is whether the informants,
many of whom do not own watches, are able to give suﬃciently accurate information about what happened
in particular time slots. The problem is not only forgetting, but the ability to anchor activities to times
of the day. Some exploratory work done by Statistics South Africa suggests that there are many ways in
which even rural South Africans succeed in doing so2. They use radio and T.V. schedules, the passage of
buses and trains and information from other individuals to keep track of time. There will undoubtedly be
measurement error in many of the responses. The ultimate test, however, is to see whether the data provide
a sensible picture of particular social processes. That can only be seen if social scientists start making use
of the information. Thus far only a few analyses have appeared (Budlender et al. 2001, Chobokoane 2002).
One of the subsidiary aims of this paper is to highlight some of the uses to which this information can be
put.
3.2 Deﬁnition of the school-going population
In order to analyse schooling we need to know who is (or should be) in school. This is in fact not obtainable
in the Time Use Survey. At no stage were individuals asked whether they were currently enrolled in school.
This immediately limits certain kinds of analyses. For instance we cannot conclusively tell what school-going
individuals do on the weekend, since we cannot tell which members of the age cohort that we observe on
w e e k e n d sw o u l dg ot os c h o o ld u r i n gt h ew o r k i n gw e e k .
Our main proxy for the school eligible population are individuals aged twenty years and younger who
have had incomplete education and who report that they had a “typical” day. The reason for the high age
cut-oﬀ is two fold. On the one hand it is a fact that many Africans (the bulk of the sample) take several
years longer to complete education than one would expect in terms of “normal” progression (Anderson et
al. 2001). Secondly being able to increase the sample size improves the precision of many of the estimates.
The results do not change substantially with a lower age cut-oﬀ.
When we analyse the school day itself, we will restrict the sample further to individuals who actually
recorded that they attended “school”3. As noted earlier we also generally exclude individuals interviewed
on weekends. There are a few individuals who report attending school on the weekend, but they are such
exceptional cases (and probably not part of the mainstream schooling system) that little is lost by excluding
them.
2personal communication from Debbie Budlender
3In fact the time use category is “school, technikon, college or university attendance”. By restricting the sample to individuals
w i t hl e s st h a n1 2y e a r so fs c h o o l i n gw eh o p et oe n s u r et h a tw ea r ed e a l i n gi nt h em a i nw i t hs c h o o ls t u d e n t s .
4Estimate Standard error n
African .819 .016 2065
Coloured .762 .036 248
Indian .906 .045 54
White .905 .033 128
Urban formal .851 .019 911
Urban informal .783 .029 557
Non-farm rural .822 .023 666
Farm rural: overall .645 .047 365
Female .609 .053 198
Male .679 .052 167
Notes:
All point estimates are weighted. Standard errors are corrected for clus-
tering and stratiﬁcation by urban formal, urban informal, farm and other
rural areas.
Table 1: School attendance among people twenty years or younger, with incomplete education having a
typical day during the working week
3.3 Household income
In many of the analyses below we will be concerned with the eﬀect of household income. As indicated above
this was measured in the household survey through a set of discrete categories. This reduces the variation
available. Furthermore there was little probing around the information recorded. We would expect therefore
that the quality of the income information is poor. In many of the analyses we use the categories as such.
In other cases we have converted the information into a continuous variable, using the midpoints of the
categories as our point estimates and twice the top bound for the open category.
3.4 Summary statistics
In Table A1 we present some simple statistics on these subsamples. For the sake of comparison we also provide
the statistics for all young individuals (aged twenty years and younger) in column 1. The oversampling of
urban informal and farm areas is evident when comparing the raw counts against the best estimate of the
population proportions, using the Statistics South Africa weights. We notice also that young women seem
to have been oversampled relative to young men.
4 School attendance
Theoretically all South African children are compelled to attend school up to age sixteen. Nevertheless it
is clear that enrollment is not universal. In table 1 we show what percentage of people age twenty years
and younger with incomplete secondary schooling actually attend school according to the time use survey4.
One might think that some of these may already have dropped out of school altogether and be active in the
labour force.
Nevertheless, as table 2 shows, taking out those young people who are employed or who are actively
searching for work changes some of the details but does not aﬀect the overall picture. There are substantial
numbers of young South Africans with incomplete education who do not attend school. We observe that
there is a racial and a geographic component to this picture. In particular, children on farms are much
less likely to attend school. There are, however, no statistically signiﬁcant gender diﬀerences in these raw
attendance rates, except on farms; and then only in the case of the estimates reported in table 2.
4The essence of the picture does not change if we adopt the cut-oﬀ of sixteen years. In order to improve the precision of
some of the estimates and analyses later on, we have used the somewhat higher age cutoﬀ.
5Estimate Standard error n
African .857 .014 1750
Coloured .864 .029 203
Indian 1.0 0 48
White .933 .031 110
Urban formal .882 .016 805
Urban informal .814 .030 467
Non-farm rural .869 .020 558
Farm rural: overall .767 .045 283
Female .665 .062 170
Male .886 .037 113
Notes:
All point estimates are weighted. Standard errors are corrected for clus-
tering and stratiﬁcation by urban formal, urban informal, farm and other
rural areas.
Table 2: School attendance among people twenty years or younger, with incomplete education, who are not
economically active and having a typical day during the working week
What we cannot deduce from these statistics is whether the children who were not at school were enrolled
and playing truant, or whether they were simply not enrolled. The time use survey gives us no direct handle
on this question. What it does give us, is a set of questions which were intended to establish the labour
market status of the respondents. They were asked whether they did any work, paid or unpaid; whether
they were interested in doing any of these kinds of work and if yes, how soon they could start. In addition
they were asked whether they had taken any action in the last four weeks to look for work. If they had
not they were asked the reasons for not looking for work. Among the reasons listed were “in education and
training”, “retired or too old to work” and so on. Many not economically active individuals did not give
reasons. In table 3 we give the school attendance by labour market status, breaking the not economically
active down into categories in so far as this is possible.
Some points are worth noting in relation to this table:
• Firstly, the relationship between labour market status and “attending school”5 generally behaves as we
would hope it would: retired people, housewives and working people generally do not attend school.
Nevertheless the relationship is not perfect: some working individuals are also studying. This is clearly
possible, since people could be studying in the evenings. It could also be due to an over-generous
deﬁnition of “working” - some students will have part-time jobs.
• Secondly, it is clear that the category that we have used as proxy for the schooling population, i.e.
those not economically active with incomplete education does seem to capture the schooling population
very well. Indeed, attendance among people not giving reasons, but who were in this category is higher
than in the category which explicitly indicated that they were schooling!
• Indeed the latter group deserves a comment: only 83% of those who explicitly indicated that they
were schooling were actually in school on the day indicated. Furthermore, our estimates are for a
working day (i.e. Monday to Friday) and we have restricted the sample to include only people who
indicated that they had had a “typical” day. The low attendance rate can therefore not be explained
by illness. It is unlikely to be entirely explained by vacations, since in the lower panel of table 3 we
have broken the attendance rate down by tranche. Even in February and October, when there are no
vacations, attendance is only around 85% of those supposedly schooling. This is prima facie evidence
for a considerable degree of absenteeism. Nevertheless the “excess” absenteeism in June (conﬁrmed
through a multivariate analysis discussed below) does suggest that we are picking up some vacations.
5remembering that this includes technikon, college and university students
6Estimate Standard error n
Working .096 .011 4424
Searching Unemployed .027 .009 689
Not economically active:
Schooling .829 .031 261
Housework 0 0 200
Retired 0 0 42
Broad unemployed .052 .023 243
No reasons given:
school age .875 .013 1875
non school-age .138 .015 1351
Schooling
February .856 .043 105
June .755 .072 60
October .843 .052 96
No reasons, school age
February .892 .019 583
June .847 .026 601
October .882 .019 691
Notes:
1) All point estimates are weighted. Standard errors are corrected for
clustering and stratiﬁcation by urban formal, urban informal, farm and
other rural areas.
2) “Broad unemployment” is deﬁned as either having taken some action
to ﬁnd employment (but not meeting the criteria of “searching unem-
ployment”) or indicating that there are no jobs to be had, as reason for
not searching.
3) “school age” is deﬁned as 20 years or younger, with less than matric.
Table 3: School attendance by labour market status
• Interestingly enough, there is evidence for lower attendance in June also among those who are school
age, but did not supply a reason why they were not searching for work. This is consistent both with
our sample containing some school students on vacation, or with simply worse discipline in the winter
months. Indeed we will see that punctuality among those who do attend school also drops in winter.
The results are broadly consistent with the framework sketched out in Section 2. The “racial” and
location gradients will be highly correlated with school quality and school resources. Where these are worse
the incentives to remain in school are clearly reduced. Unfortunately the time use survey does not provide
any direct information about the quality of the school or the aptitudes of the individual.
In order to investigate the relationships further we provide a simple “reduced form” probit model of
school attendance in table A2. We estimate the probability of observing an individual aged twenty years
or younger with incomplete education reporting having been at school during a typical school day. We
have included some variables that are particular to the individual, some that take the household context
into consideration and some that speak to the context of the school and community. Finally we also have
some time-speciﬁc variables. We have taken two levels of decision-making into account. In column (1) we
consider all alternatives to being at school, including paid employment and searching for work, while in
columns (2) and (3) we consider the narrower choice of actually being in school given that the individual is
not economically active.
There are some striking patterns in the data. Looking at the individual level variables ﬁrst, we note that
these are all generally very signiﬁcant. It is a bit tricky to interpret the impact of being in a higher grade,
while keeping age constant (and vice versa), but the fact that these coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant in columns
(1) and (2) and go in the opposite direction, suggests that non-attendance is most likely among people who
are “behind” in the grade for age count. The fact that the quadratic term on age is very strongly signiﬁcant
7suggests that the pressures cumulate. Indeed we would expect that once someone has fallen suﬃciently
behind, they will become permanent drop outs. One question this raises is whether the permanent drop
outs may actually be generating this pattern in a purely mechanical way, since by deﬁnition they will not
be at school and will also be behind in the grade for age stakes. As noted above, we have only a limited
capacity for identifying people who are enrolled in school. The best we can do is to use the reason that
people supply for not being economically active to identify a subset of individuals who explicitly claim to be
schooling, as in column (3). This has drastic implications for the sample size and hence the signiﬁcance of
the results. Nevertheless the point estimate for the marginal eﬀect of age is still negative although somewhat
smaller than for the equivalent results in columns (1) and (2) and the eﬀect of years of schooling attained
is still positive. This suggests that there is considerable non-attendance even among people claiming to be
at school. Furthermore the point estimates conﬁrm that students that have had either less academic success
earlier in life or who have had previous bouts of absenteeism are somewhat more likely to be absent from
school.
We note that the qualitative results are quite similar. This suggests that the pressures leading to per-
manent dropping out of school (deﬁnitely captured in the ﬁr s tm o d e l )a r en o ta l lt h a td i ﬀerent from the
pressures leading to more temporary absenteeism from school. Indeed there is probably a continuum of be-
haviour - from temporary absences of relative short durations, through longer periods of absenteeism leading
to grade repetition to outright dropping out.
Turning to the household composition variables, we note that the coeﬃcient on the household size variable
is positive and signiﬁcant in models (1) and (2), while that on the number of children is negative. The
variables are jointly signiﬁcant at least at the 10% level (the results are shown at the bottom of table A2).
An increase in the household size, controlling for the number of children is, of course, equivalent to an increase
in the number of adults. The results therefore suggest that the more adults there are in the household, the
more likely it is that the individual concerned will be in school. There are a number of mechanisms that
might be at play. There may be better monitoring. There may be less pressure to support the household
or assist with chores (such as childminding). Having more children in the household seems to oﬀset these
potential advantages. The overall eﬀects are, however, weak.
Household income, surprisingly, is even weaker. Indeed it is non-signiﬁcant. This might suggest that
direct costs are not the biggest factor in the schooling decision. Given the fact that we are controlling for
community level variables, it may also be the case that household income does not provide a suﬃcienly big
independent increase on the productivity of school time to make a big diﬀerence to the decision whether
or not to stay on at school. More troubling is the possibility that household income may be related to the
wage rate w that learners might expect on exiting the school system. This might be the case, for instance, if
there was a strong insider-outsider division of the labour market (Wittenberg 2002). In this case low income
learners would be faced with a lower opportunity cost of schooling, leading to higher retention rates in the
school system than one might otherwise expect.
The community variables also hold some surprises. The “race” variables are never jointly signiﬁcant.
This is somewhat unexpected given that education was historically stratiﬁed on race and while this is no
longer the case many of the diﬀerences between schools persist. Although many African families do send
their children to historically “White” schools, this is not possible for the majority. We note, however, that
in models (2) and (3) the “Indian” subsample showed 100% attendance, so that a separate coeﬃcient could
not be estimated.
The “stratum” variables, by contrast, are always jointly signiﬁcant, at least at the 10% level. The
pattern of the coeﬃcients is also very interesting. When compared to the base category (of urban formal
areas), attendance is about two percentage points lower in urban informal areas, ﬁve percentage points lower
in the previous homeland areas and fourteen percentage points lower in the commercial farm areas. The
latter conﬁrms the picture presented in tables 1 and 2, although the relative rankings of urban informal and
homeland rural areas in the attendance stakes is reversed from those in the raw tabulations. The worse
performance of farm areas in school attendance is true even when we restrict the sample to people not
economically active. The reason for low attendance is therefore not simply due to an earlier start of the
working life. It suggests worse access to education or perhaps just worse education (i.e. a lower incentive to
enrol).
The “provincial” dummies, perhaps surprisingly, are never individually or jointly signiﬁcant.
8Turning to the time variables, we observe that models (1) and (2) suggest that attendance in June is
about ﬁve percentage points lower than in February or October. In the subsample of people claiming that
they were schooling, however, this drop oﬀ seems much larger, although like with all coeﬃcients in model
(3), the eﬀects are measured quite imprecisely.
Perhaps most interestingly, in models (2) and (3) we observe some day of the week eﬀects. The F-tests
for the joint signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients come out quite strongly in favour of the existence of such eﬀects,
although the individual coeﬃcients are generally not signiﬁcant. The point estimates suggest that attendance
is higher in the middle of the week (Wednesday and Thursday) and lower on Fridays. The fact that these
eﬀects are statistically stronger in models (2) and (3) also seems plausible: one would not expect to see day
of week eﬀects to feature much in the “big” decision whether to work or attend school.
Taken together the pattern of the coeﬃcients in table A2 presents a reasonably coherent picture of the
determinants of school attendance: Access to quality education matters, hence the geographical gradient
that we observe in moving from urban formal to urban informal to homeland rural to farm areas. The
prospect of future success also matters, hence the importance of the grade for age score. This matters most
when considering the relative beneﬁts of entering the labour market versus staying at school, hence the
declining marginal eﬀect of age in models (1) through (3). The relationships within the household matter,
since they determine some of the opportunity costs of staying on at school. Direct costs seem to matter less,
since schooling within the government sector is supposed to be free. Once the big decision whether or not
to stay at school is given, the small decision whether or not to attend on a speciﬁcd a yi sa ﬀected both by
the rhythm of the seasons, with attendance smaller in winter, and by the rhythm of the week.
It follows, of course, that the set of people that are attending school on any one day is not a random
subset of the set of all individuals who have incomplete education. The people at school are more likely to
be relatively successful students, for example. This should be borne in mind when we turn to our analysis
of the experience of the school day6.
5 A picture of the school day
5.1 Before school
The typical school day begins with virtually all school students asleep. What do students do after rising?
About 38% of them will engage in some form of household chore, such as cooking or cleaning. As Table 4
makes clear, there are strong gender and racial dimensions to the performance of these chores, with African
women most likely to have these responsibilities. Indeed, we will see later (see Table 9 below), that African
female school students spend, on average over an hour a day cooking.
What is the overall eﬀect of such an early start? We note that in Table 5 there is no real evidence for
big racial and gender diﬀerences in the total quantity of sleep obtained. On average most school students
get about nine hours of sleep during the school week. This suggests that those children who perform early
morning chores are more likely to also turn in early. This in turn suggests that the real eﬀect of these chores
is to reduce leisure time and perhaps reduce home work time.
The lack of variation in Table 5 is misleading, however, as Table A3, column 1 reveals. This regression
suggests that sleep time decreases with age (at a decreasing rate) and education. Roughly speaking a ten
year old in grade four would be sleeping 65 minutes more a day than an eighteen year old in grade 12. Given
the increasing demands in higher grades this is not surprising. Indeed, the drop in sleep time with age can be
seen also in U.S. and Japanese children (Juster and Staﬀord 1991, Table 4, p.480). More surprising, perhaps,
is the fact that sleep decreases strongly with income. A school child in the highest income bracket sleeps
three-quarters of an hour less than a child in the poorest category. Part of the reason for this is undoubtedly
that richer children have more options than poorer ones: they can watch TV for instance (for a detailed
discussion of the income eﬀects on sleep see Biddle and Hamermesh 1990, Szalontai 2004). Another very
suggestive feature of the regression is that school students living in the eastern half of the country seem to
have about half an hour less sleep than those in the western. This feature would make sense if waking up
6This might suggest that we should be doing “sample selection” corrections. It is diﬃcult to think about variables that
would help to predict whether someone attends school but that should not directly enter into any of the “eﬀort” variables that
we will be measuring.
9Estimatea Standard error n
Cleaning
African Female .343 .026 936
Male .235 .023 871
Coloured Female .153 .053 106
Male .086 .057 77
Indian Female .238 .105 27
Male .167 .087 30
White Female .136 .054 71
Male .140 .065 63
Overall .265 .017 2183b
Cooking
African Female .249 .022 936
Male .174 .018 871
Coloured Female .132 .059 106
Male .073 .030 77
Indian Female 0 0 27
Male .088 .047 30
White Female .136 .059 71
Male .013 .010 63
Overall .191 .013 2183b
Notes:
a) All point estimates are weighted. Standard errors are corrected for
clustering and stratiﬁcation by urban formal, urban informal, farm and
other rural areas.
b) There were two individuals whose race was classiﬁed either as “other”
or was missing.
Table 4: Household chores before the school day
Estimatea Standard error n
African Female 547.6 4.1 852
Male 548.8 4.6 806
Coloured Female 534.8 10.7 94
Male 551.7 7.7 72
Indian Female 530.9 17.4 23
Male 559.1 10.2 27
White Female 544.8 12.3 61
Male 532.7 12.0 53
Overall 547.1 2.9 1990b
Notes:
a) All point estimates are weighted. Standard errors are corrected for
clustering and stratiﬁcation by urban formal, urban informal, farm and
other rural areas. The sample is restricted to individuals who had a
“typical” day.
b) There were two individuals whose race was classiﬁed either as “other”
or was missing.
Table 5: Minutes spent sleeping during the school week
10Estimatea Standard error n
Personal hygiene prior to school
African Female .990 .004 936
Male .983 .008 871
Coloured Female .991 .007 106
Male .980 .011 77
Indian Female .964 .027 27
Male .951 .045 30
White Female .935 .034 71
Male .990 .008 63
Overall .984 .004 2183b
Breakfast prior to school
African Female .661 .027 936
Male .723 .023 871
Coloured Female .764 .047 106
Male .869 .046 77
Indian Female .597 .110 27
Male .873 .070 30
White Female .826 .052 71
Male .937 .029 63
Female Youngerc .708 .029 648
Olderc .642 .031 493
Male Youngerc .758 .028 549
Olderc .736 .027 493
Overall .714 .017 2183b
Notes:
a) All point estimates are weighted. Standard errors are corrected for
clustering and stratiﬁcation by urban formal, urban informal, farm and
other rural areas.
b) There were two individuals whose race was classiﬁed either as “other”
or was missing.
c) Younger is deﬁned as 10 to 14 years (inclusive) while older is older
than 14 years.
Table 6: Washing and eating before going to school
was aﬀected by daylight, but going to sleep was governed more by TV schedules than by the surrounding
light.
5.2 Getting ready
Virtually all school goers engage in some form of personal hygiene prior to leaving for school as can be seen
in Table 6. The contrast with the proportion eating breakfast is quite striking (also shown in Table 6). Only
about 71% of school children arrive at school haven eaten breakfast. Given that almost all students report
having washed prior to school, it is unlikely that this percentage is due to forgetting or bad reporting. Given
how important nutrition is for the ability to perform in school (D.McCoy, Barron and Wigton, eds 1997,
pp.8—9), this is a rather alarming statistic.
It may be possible that some learners skip breakfast in anticipation of being fed at school. Given that
the school nutrition programme is targetted only at primary schools, we would expect that the probability of
eating breakfast would in that case increase with age. The results from a probit regression reported in Table
A4 column 1, however show that the trend is the reverse. Older learners are more likely to skip breakfast
than the younger ones.
We would expect poverty to be a major determinant of whether a learner eats breakfast or not. The
11Probability of eating breakfast by age and gender
age
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Figure 1: Girls are more likely to skip breakfast than boys - and this gap increases with age. We show the
predicted probabilities of having eaten breakfast, evaluated at the means of all the other variables.
regressions support this view, up to a point. The income coeﬃcients in that regression are jointly statistically
signiﬁcant and the point estimates show that individuals in the top two income brackets have a much higher
probability of having eaten breakfast. Nevertheless the income coeﬃcients are not as consistent and as strong
as one might have supposed. This suggests that there may also be non-economic factors at work. Indeed
table 6 points to a strong gender dimension of skipping breakfast. Furthermore, as we observe in the bottom
most panel of the table, there is a gender-age interaction, with older girls less likely to arrive at school having
eaten than younger girls. The diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level, whereas the very small
diﬀerence between younger and older boys is not statistically signiﬁcant at all.
This conclusion is reinforced by the probit regression. The coeﬃcients are diﬃcult to interpret as they
stand7 but in Figure 1 we have graphed the predicted probabilities of having eaten breakfast for boys and
girls at diﬀerent ages, keeping all other attributes constant. We have set these at the means of all these
variables. It is evident that the coeﬃcient on age for girls (-0.04) translates into roughly a twelve percentage
point drop in the probability of having eaten breakfast between the ages of ten and eighteen. The equivalent
coeﬃcient for boys, which is the sum of the age coeﬃcient and the age*gender interaction eﬀect, is not
statistically signiﬁcant and amounts to a drop of around two percentage points.
It is hard to escape the conclusion that social processes impacting particularly on teenage girls are
producing this gender gap. There are two potential explanations. Teenage girls in poorer households may be
more pressed to assist with chores prior to leaving home, reducing the time available to eat8. Alternatively,
social pressures to reduce weight may be the major issue. Given the fact that girls are less likely to eat
even in aﬄuent communities (Whites and Indians) the latter explanation seems more cogent. That raises
questions about the impact of such social dynamics on educational outcomes.
5.3 Attending school
In Table 7 we show the cumulative proportion of children who are at school in half-hourly intervals up to
9.30 a.m. The proportions are taken over all children who will at some stage during that day record being at
school as one of their activities. Given the fact that there will inevitably be some absentees the proportion
7We have not reported the marginal eﬀects for age, age*gender and gender, since the standard calculations are not very
meaningful, given the interaction eﬀect.
8I thank Debbie Budlender for pointing out this possibility.
12Time Cumulative Proportion Standard error
Before 7.00 a.m. .0063 .0022
Before 7.30 a.m. .0535 .0085
Before 8.00 a.m. .2419 .0181
Before 8.30 a.m. .7945 .0157
Before 9.00 a.m. .9333 .0091
Before 9.30 a.m. .9714 .0047
Notes:
1. All point estimates are weighted. Standard errors are corrected for
clustering and stratiﬁcation by urban formal, urban informal, farm and
other rural areas.
2. The estimates are for individuals younger than twenty, with incom-
plete education, who attended school during a typical day, Monday to
Friday.
3. n=1990
T a b l e7 :T i m ea tw h i c hs c h o o l i n gc o m m e n c e s
of those enrolled must be smaller. One of the most startling points to emerge is that many South African
school students seem to start school late. While one quarter of school students has commenced schooling
activities by eight, fully twenty percent have not yet done so by 8h30. Without further information it is
impossible to diagnose exactly what is the case: perhaps many students arrive late, or it might be that they
wait for the teacher to arrive or perhaps some schools are scheduled to start late. Some initial enquiries
at the Ministry of Education suggested that there is no “oﬃcial school day” and that there is no central
information about school opening and closing times. Anecdotal evidence suggests that punctuality at many
schools is a serious issue and that this may become a “low level equilibrium”: students arrive late in certain
schools, knowing full well that the teachers will not start with activities well into the school day. On the
other hand in some more rural schools the school day may start later in order to give learners time to walk
there.
We investigate these relationships and possible explanations further by means of a probit model. In Table
A4, column 2 we estimate the probability that an individual will be doing an activity called “school” by
8.30 a.m. One of the most striking features of those results is the very strong income gradient. Children in
households in the higher income brackets are much more likely to be on time. “Punctuality” seems to be a
problem mainly in poor households or in the schools serving these communities. The marginal eﬀects show
an interestingly progressive pattern. Children from households in the R1200 to R1799 category show a 7
percentage point improvement in the arrival rate over the poorest categories. This goes up to 13 percentage
points in the next higher bracket and reaches 16 percentage points at the top. Given a base-line predicted
probability of 81% this implies that virtually all students from the richest households are schooling by 8.30
a.m.
We note that the hypothesis about later starts in rural areas is not borne out by the spatial variables.
Furthermore we have included a separate variable measuring whether the nearest school was close by (within
a half hour walk). The point estimate on this variable suggests that having a school close by improves
punctuality, but the eﬀect is not statistically strong. This suggests that it is individual or household level
factors rather than community-wide ones that are at play.
There is an interesting temporal dimension: punctuality drops oﬀ in June and improves in October.
While these coeﬃcients are not individually signiﬁcant, they are jointly signiﬁcant. The results are very
much in accordance with our expectations: in winter we would expect worse punctuality (six percentage
points at the mean). The coeﬃcients on the days of the week also make some sense, with worst punctuality
on Mondays, but they are not individually or jointly signiﬁcant, so we can’t draw too many inferences from
them.
An interesting question that follows on from this, is how much actual class time there is in the typical
school day. In order to calculate this we have simply assumed that the activity recorded as “school” is actual
class time. This may, of course, not be correct. In our sample the average time reported was 305 minutes.
13By contrast, the length of the average school day was 352 minutes9.
In Table A3, columns 2 and 3, we report regression in which we try to explain the length of the school
day and the number of minutes spent in class. They give fairly similar results. Some of the coeﬃcients are
as one would expect: the length of the school day increases with grade, but not with age. Perhaps the most
surprising result is that income does not have much of an eﬀect on the overall length of time spent on school
- except for a marked discontinuity in the top income bracket. Since most of these individuals are White
(69% in our sample), this coeﬃcient is oﬀ-set to some extent by the negative “White” coeﬃcient. This might
suggest that the gap in schooling hours between poor and rich Black children is larger than the gap between
poor and rich White ones. Given the small sample size in this category one is probably advised to discount
this particular eﬀect.
In view of the fact that poorer children seem to start the school day later, it is interesting that there
seems to be little impact on the overall time spent schooling. There seem to be two explanations for this.
On the one hand the pressures which lead to poorer children arriving later (e.g. lack of private transport)
may also lead them to hang around at the school a bit longer. Alternatively we may be picking up systemic
factors - that entire schools servicing poorer children start later and close later. If it is the former, then
clearly time at school is a bad measure of time devoted to learning.
Again there is a seasonal eﬀect, with somewhat shorter hours in winter. This suggests that at least
some of what we are picking up in these measures is not only the rules of these institutions, but also the
punctuality of the students.
5.4 Doing home work
In Figure 3 we explore some of the temporal patterns associated with home work. It should be noted
that each of the graphs derives from an independent cross-section. In order to provide some benchmarks
for comparison we have also indicated a two standard deviation band around the point estimates10.T h e
patterns that emerge seem eminently reasonable, with the peak in each graph around 8.00 p.m. with the
exception of Saturdays. It also seems clear that there are pronounced day of week eﬀects, with Monday
being a particularly high demand day. There are some amusing features that somehow ring true. Sunday
nights seem to show higher levels of home work than Friday nights and there is a small cluster of last minute
cramming happening around 6.00 am on Friday morning.
Restricting attention to individuals who are recorded as actually attending school, about 56% of these
will also be doing home work on that day (see Table 8). The average time spent on home work is 53 minutes,
but since this includes a lot of people who do zero minutes home work, perhaps the more useful statistic
is that the average among those who do any home work is ninety four minutes (Table 8). These aggregate
statistics conceal an important outlier, however. Indian girls distinguish themselves not only by having a
greater probability of doing home work on any given day (around 90%) but they also spend much longer
doing it. As a result the average time spent per day on home work is over an hour longer than for the
population average (124 minutes as against 53 minutes). This cannot be simply a function of the demands of
the schools in which these girls ﬁnd themselves, since we would then expect the boys to face similar demands.
The special circumstances of Indian (and to a lesser extent White) girls is conﬁrmed in the regressions
reported in columns 4 and 5 of table A3. Column 4 reports an OLS regression in which the zeros are
treated as ordinary observations. This is clearly problematic as the distribution is censored to the left.
There undoubtedly are individuals who would like to spend negative time on home work, but that is just
not possible! To estimate the model without the zeros would be incorrect, as it would suggest that these
observations are not supplying any useful information. One approach would be to estimate a sample selection
model, in which we would estimate the probability of doing home work in the ﬁrst stage and then estimating
the minutes spent doing home work, conditional on doing home work, in the second. In order for such a
procedure to provide properly identiﬁed coeﬃcients we would need to have variables in the ﬁrst stage which
do not belong in the second stage. It seems very doubtful that there could be factors which inﬂuence whether
or not someone does home work, but not inﬂuence how much time they spend on it. Indeed unless the home
9We calculated this by assuming that students are at school from the beginning of the ﬁrst period at which they mention
“school” as an activity to the end of the last period in which they do so.
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African female .5718 90.11 51.52 852
(.0261) (3.266) (3.525)
African male .5153 94.47 48.68 806
(.0290) (3.821) (3.502)
Coloured female .5495 104.63 57.49 94
(.0727) (12.907) (10.177)
Coloured male .6658 77.75 51.76 72
(.0648) (9.445) (8.111)
Indian female .9024 137.89 124.43 23
(.0758) (17.851) (18.31)
Indian male .4754 89.25 42.42 27
(.1260) (8.251) (12.168)
White female .8295 106.86 88.64 61
(.0566) (11.309) (12.225)
White male .5910 124.18 73.39 53
(.1402) (21.508) (23.186)
Overall .5600 94.60 52.97 1990
(.0186) (2.582) (2.432)
Notes:
1. All point estimates are weighted. Standard errors are given in brack-
ets. These are corrected for clustering and stratiﬁcation by urban formal,
urban informal, farm and other rural areas.
2. The estimates are for individuals younger than twenty, with incom-
plete education, who attended school during a typical day, Monday to
Friday.
Table 8: Time spent doing homework
16work is prescribed for the very next day, individuals can plan the time to be devoted to home work over a
number of days. There is even some support for this idea in Table 8 above: White boys seem to do home
work less frequently than White girls, but when they do, they spend longer on it. Figure 2 of course provides
yet more evidence of such intertemporal reallocation.
Instead of estimating a sample selection model, we opted for a simple tobit model (reported in column
5 of table A3). For what it is worth, we also report a probit model of the probability of doing home work
in column 3 of table A4. The main conclusions from all these analyses are fairly similar. Household income
is again not signiﬁcant at all. Children in higher grades have a higher probability of doing home work and
when they do it they tend to spend more time on it. This is not surprising if the eﬀort required to acquire
an additional unit of human capital is increasing in HL, i.e. if ∂
2HL
∂t2
s < 0, which would be a fairly normal
assumption. Indeed it could also be explained in terms of the strongly convex returns to education function
that seems to characterise the South African labour market (Lam 1999).
There seems to be signiﬁcantly more home work in the June period than in either February or October
and the probability of doing home work as well as the length of time devoted to it, decreases over the school
week.
The special situation of Indian girls emerges even more spectacularly in the regression results in Table
A311. It seems clear that the eﬀe c tw ea r et r a c i n gh e r em u s tb er e l a t e dto “cultural” expectations of the
appropriate behaviour of girls. It is not simply an income eﬀect, because the income variables are not
signiﬁcant. It seems very much as though for Indian girls (and to a lesser extent for White girls) the value of
home work time exceeds the value of other uses of time within their relevant choice sets. The key question
is what these choice sets are: do these girls have the option of spending their time on leisure, or are they
expected to help with chores if they do not do home work? The relevant trade-oﬀ may therefore be not so
much between home work and leisure as between home work and chores.
If this is, indeed, the case we may ask why Indian girls are so special. Why don’t we see similar sort of
trade-oﬀs in the case of African girls? In fact Table 9 makes it clear that African school girls are exceptional
in the quantity of chores expected of them: more than an hour a day, devoted to cooking alone. This suggest
that the choice set of African girls is even more limited than that of Indian ones: time for home work may
be residual, in the sense that the chores have to be performed ﬁrst. Multivariate regressions, reported in
columns 6 and 7 of table A3 and in column 4 of table A4 conﬁrm the special situation of African women.
They also indicate that the pressures are relieved to a limited extent in larger households and that the
expectations of the amount of work performed change with the age of the individual.
5.5 Other post-school activities
The diﬀerence between girls and boys can be seen also when we consider the typical timing of home work and
how this relates to other activities. In 3 we see that girls tend to do their home work somewhat earlier than
boys, frequently before supper. A substantial number of boys spends the afternoon in games, recreational
activities or simply socialising with friends (see 4). It is interesting to note that girls not only do their home
work earlier, they also seem to switch the TV on earlier. The patterns in Figure 4 are consistent with parents
exercising more control over their daughters and restricting their movements to either organised games or
acivities that can be carried out within the house. As noted above, many girls are also expected to help with
the cooking (see Figure 5). All of these support our conjecture above that girls structure their activities
within much tighter constraints than boys. The alternative would be to suppose that girls and boys simply
have diﬀerent preferences over the desirability of recreation or socialising with friends. It is therefore not
surprising that the pattern and timing of home work is diﬀerent among boys and girls.
One noteworthy feature to emerge from Figure 4 is the extent to which TV is part of the daily routine
of school goers. This is brought home even more forcefully in Table 10. It is startling to observe that over
half of all school students watch TV during the school week and among those who do, the mean time in
front of the TV is close to two and a half hours per day! Furthermore the TV time which is used here is
corrected for multiple activities occurring, i.e. if an individual reported both watching TV as well as eating
11The probit model for doing homework was also estimated with a full set of race and gender interaction eﬀects. The point








African female .710 90.53 64.24 852
(.0219) (3.544) (3.069)
African male .352 53.59 18.85 806
(.0258) (3.296) (1.832)
Coloured female .519 50.79 26.38 94
(.0713) (6.412) (4.413)
Coloured male .220 43.00 9.44 72
(.0595) (7.329) (3.436)
Indian female .253 36.54 9.24 23
(.1104) (5.511) (4.233)
Indian male .168 30 5.05 27
(.0699) (0) (2.098)
White female .272 41.90 11.40 61
(.0638) (4.388) (2.730)
White male .071 55.42 3.930 53
(.0349) (11.97) (1.967)
Overall .489 75.32 36.81 1990
(.0162) (2.652) (1.855)
Notes:
1. All point estimates are weighted. Standard errors are given in brack-
ets. These are corrected for clustering and stratiﬁcation by urban formal,
urban informal, farm and other rural areas.
2. The estimates are for individuals younger than twenty, with incom-
plete education, who attended school during a typical day, Monday to
Friday.



































homework during the school day
time
 girls  boys











































 girls  boys


















































































socialising with non-family members
time

















































































cooking done during the school day
time
 girls  boys














African female .491 157.50 77.34 852
(.0353) (6.125) (6.446)
African male .496 133.77 66.30 806
(.0326) (5.271) (4.791)
Coloured female .882 163.31 144.04 94
(.0361) (12.664) (12.322)
Coloured male .875 149.37 130.70 72
(.0525) (13.471) (14.368)
Indian female .849 151.88 128.93 23
(.0978) (21.502) (22.903)
Indian male .964 131.98 127.27 27
(.0364) (21.528) (21.335)
White female .845 139.95 118.32 61
(.0686) (15.956) (16.429)
White male .941 169.41 159.49 53
(.0349) (24.830) (25.448)
Overall .554 147.28 81.66 1990
(.0251) (4.130) (4.455)
Notes:
1. All point estimates are weighted. Standard errors are given in brack-
ets. These are corrected for clustering and stratiﬁcation by urban formal,
urban informal, farm and other rural areas.
2. The estimates are for individuals younger than twenty, with incom-
plete education, who attended school during a typical day, Monday to
Friday.
Table 10: Time spent watching TV
supper in a half-hour period, then only ﬁfteen minutes would be counted as TV time. To the extent to which
students are multi-tasking, the actual TV time may be even higher. This is unlikely to be beneﬁcial from
an educational point of view - even if the TV is only running in the background..
The main source of variation in the mean TV time in Table 10 arises from the diﬀerent propensities to
watch TV, rising from 49% in the case of African women to 96% among Indian males. We would expect
there to be a strong income component to this gradient. However, as the multivariate analyses reported
in columns 8 and 9 of Table A3 and column 5 of Table A4 show, the relationship is more of an inverse U:
TV consumption rises rapidly with income, but then drops down again in the highest income groups. The
decline at the top end of the income distribution is very interesting, but we have not investigated thus far
what to attribute this to. It is possible that these children consume more expensive forms of entertainment.
The other coeﬃcients in those regressions behave fairly much as expected. Location matters a lot. TV
consumption is higher in urban formal areas than in urban informal areas and much higher than in the rural
areas. This probably reﬂects the availability of electricity as well as diﬀerences in the clarity of reception.
Consumption increases with age, at a decreasing rate and depends on household composition. Consumption
is higher in households made up mainly of adults. This suggests that there are at least some externalities
from other people’s consumption of TV. If older siblings or parents have switched on the TV, then this would
tend to increase the consumption of the younger members of the household also.
206R e ﬂecting on the ﬁndings
We began this discussion with a simple analytical time allocation model. Some of the patterns that we have
found are in accordance with that framework:
• School enrolment is lowest in parts of the country where we would expect school quality and resources
available to the schools to be lowest.
• Punctuality improves signiﬁcantly with household income.
• The probability of enrolment is lower among people who are behind in the grade for age and hence
have lower revealed ability or lower prospect of successful completion.
• The eﬀort put into school work and home work increases with grade. We would expect this on at least
two counts. Firstly the human capital “production function” may have decreasing marginal returns to
eﬀort, requiring additional study time to acquire an extra year’s qualiﬁcation. Secondly the earnings
function shows strongly increasing returns to education suggesting that the additional time is well
worth it.
• Some of the temporal patterns can also be explained within a “short-run” version of the framework.
If the disutility of schooling (or utility of leisure) increases in winter and towards the end of the school
week, it is not surprising to ﬁnd attendance and punctuality dropping oﬀ.
Some non-results can also be reconciled with that framework:
• Household income does not seem to be a strong independent predictor of enrolment. This would be
the case if the main determinants in the human capital production function are community level ones.
• Household income does not seem to signiﬁcantly aﬀect home work time or school time. This could
be explained in several ways. Firstly, we may be dealing with a selection issue, where poor children
that are remain enrolled in the school system perhaps have better motivation and ability on average.
Secondly, we may be faced with a measurement issue. It is not clear whether the quality of the time
devoted is equivalent. If it is true that children who arrive later also drift home later, we may be
including some “dead” time as part of our measured school time. This would be even more true if the
teachers do not spend a full day teaching. Thirdly, it may be the case that household income permits
the purchase of inputs (such as computers) which aﬀect the productivity of time put in to study, thus
reducing the value of additional time put in to school work.
• These non-results seem to run counter to our ﬁnding that punctuality is predicted by income. We can
reconcile these ﬁndings if the value of punctuality to rich parents is diﬀerent to the value of punctuality
to poor parents. This might be, for instance, if richer parents personally drop their children oﬀ at
school on their way to work. In this case the high value of the parents’ time may reﬂect itself in greater
punctuality for their children. Poor parents, by contrast, might rely on children getting themselves to
school.
Some additional results can be interpreted through simple extensions of the time allocation framework:
• The lower sleep/higher leisure time characterising richer children can be explained in a richer model
in which sleep and diﬀerent varieties of leisure feature in the utility function (Wittenberg 2005). The
larger variety of activities on oﬀer to richer kids may stimulate substitution away from sleep if the
elasticity of substitution is suﬃciently high.
• The higher prevalence of chores performed by poore rc h i l d r e nc a nb ee x p l a i n e di nam o d e li nw h i c ht h e
overall household maximises its utility by allocating times to home production, production in the work
place, school work and leisure. If work performed by poor children is seen as a “bad” in the household
utility function, it will be lower in high income households.
21What is much harder to accommodate in this sort of framework is the particularly gendered nature of
the chores performed. It seems clear that girls perform more work and boys play more. It is hard to escape
the conclusion that they operate under diﬀerent constraints. These constraints seem to arise from cultural
expectations about appropriate behaviour. A diﬀerent area where such expectations seem to matter is in
the nutrition choices of teenage girls.
It may be the case that such constraints are simply accepted by everyone within the household and
they become part of the background against which the time allocation decisions take place. However, if
our interpretation of the excessive quantities of “home work” performed by Indian girls is correct, then the
reality seems less simple. It looks as though the choices made by some household members have strategic
elements to them — responses to preferences and choices by other household members. It appears as if there
are intra-household bargaining games about the distribution of chores, “work” and leisure.
The possibility that the choices by some agents create externalities for the decisions of others is an
important lesson. Indeed it is possible that spillovers are pervasive in the education system. Lazear (2001),
for instance, has suggested that learners potentially create negative spill-over eﬀects for each other. If one
person in a class is “behind” and asks questions that are obvious for everyone else, then this person delays
the learning process12. If the disruption occurs at a high enough frequency, then the incentive to learn for
the others in the class diminishes. The quality of the schooling is therefore not simply a function of the
qualiﬁcations of the teacher or the physical resources available, but also of the characteristics of the peers.
This possibility would increase the salience of some observations made earlier:
• the high rate of grade repetition among poor South African learners (see Anderson et al. 2001). If
repeaters have lower ability this may create disruptive class-room eﬀects for the rest of the learners.
• the lower level of punctuality among poor learners. If students drift in to lessons this is bound to have
a disruptive eﬀect.
• the lower rates of attendance in poorer areas in the country. If these rates are not made up exclusively
of permanent drop-outs, then this truancy could also interfere with the learning process of the rest of
the class.
In short there are ample indications that the educational process may function less well in the poor parts
of the country. A troublesome prospect is that these peer-eﬀects work in ways that amplify the “natural”
time allocation processes. In areas where teacher quality is not that high and schools are underresourced,
the lower level of eﬀort by some students creates negative peer eﬀects that magnify these problems. It is
also easy to see how selection processes operating on teachers may accelerate these eﬀects yet further. Good
teachers may ﬁnd such disruptive environments less conducive to teach in and may be bid away by better
resourced, richer schools. This is possible even in the public education system, where richer parents can ﬁnd
unoﬃcial incentives to keep or attract better teachers.
If processes like these are at work in South Africa then it should emerge quite clearly in some of the
observable output variables, like matric pass rates or matric grades. From the published matric results it
is clear that vast diﬀerences exist between diﬀerent types of schools. The old “White” school system still
performs much better in ensuring that students pass — and pass in the technical and scientiﬁc subjects
necessary for economic development. Unfortunately the time use survey has no such information available.
Consequently we cannot see how the results achieved correlate with the eﬀorts supplied. The best that
one can do with this data set is the sort of assessment of the level of “eﬀort” supplied by students. The
“education production function” cannot be read oﬀ from these data.
Nevertheless in terms of “eﬀort” there is clearly some good news. Even learners in poor environments
seem to be putting in similar times into studying and into school work. Whether it is at the level appropriate
is a diﬀerent matter.
12Lazear notes that students may also create positive spill-over eﬀects. He argues, that if these were dominant, then the
school authorities would have the incentive to increase class size. The range of class sizes we observe in practice are therefore
l i k e l yt ob ew h e r et h en e g a t i v ee ﬀects predominate.
227C o n c l u s i o n
Many aspects of the choices made by young South Africans can be interpreted within a Human Capital
framework. The tradeoﬀs between school work, leisure and work in the labour market seem broadly in line
with that theory. Nevertheless it also seems clear that South Africa’s learners are making their educational
choices within a set of contexts heavily shaped by others. TV consumption, performance of chores, time
devoted to homework and school attendance are all inﬂuenced by what happens within the household and
the community. Similarly, whether or not learning happens on an empty stomach is inﬂuenced both by the
income of the household and a set of cultural values communicated to adolescent girls. Although we do
not have measures of educational outcomes, it would be surprising if these inﬂuences operated in ways to
maximise learning.
Evidently some of these pressures are more amenable to policy intervention than others. In particular, it
seems that the geographical gradients in school attendance might be addressed. If rural people have better
access to quality education this might provide the appropriate incentives to stay on at school.
A more troubling set of issues is raised by the possibility that learners may be creating negative peer
eﬀects for each other. Given the high rate of grade repetition among South Africa’s learners (see Anderson et
al. 2001) it is not implausible that these disruptive eﬀects exist. Furthermore we have shown that repeaters
have worse records for attendance than non-repeaters.
These connections should be investigated more thoroughly with the appropriate instruments. What we
hope to have shown is that the time spent by learners is an important part of the way in which the educational
system functions and deserves to be analysed as suc h .W ea l s oh o p et oh a v es h o w nt h a tt i m eu s ed a t ai sa
useful adjunct to other forms of information. Indeed it is surprising quite how rich these data can be. For
instance, the seasonal and day of week eﬀects identiﬁed in the regressions are all plausible and resonate with
our intuitive understanding of these processes. Despite all the misgivings about data quality mentioned at
the outset, the overall picture presented is surprisingly coherent. Certainly these data merit further analysis.
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age 0.3210 + 0.3222 + -0.1542
(0.1729) -0.039 (0.1821) -0.024 (0.6633) -0.014
age
2 -0.0185 ** -0.0164 ** 0.0020
(0.0057) (0.006) (0.021)
gender 0.1758 * 0.032 0.1686 + 0.027 0.3492 0.050
(0.0857) (0.1011) (0.3958)
Years of schooling 0.1285 ** 0.024 0.0907 ** 0.015 0.1583 0.023
(0.028) (0.032) (0.1157)
household size 0.0722 * 0.013 0.0582 + 0.009 0.0037 0.001
(0.034) (0.0334) (0.0864)
no of children -0.0601 -0.011 -0.0092 -0.001 -0.0440 -0.006
(0.0458) (0.0465) (0.158)
log household income 0.0513 0.009 0.0409 0.007 -0.1531 -0.022
(0.0709) (0.0691) (0.1554)
Coloured -0.3524 + -0.078 -0.0608 -0.010 -0.0450 -0.007
(0.1844) (0.2115) (0.5886)
Indian -0.0371 -0.007 NA NA NA NA
(0.3729)
White 0.0711 0.013 0.2252 0.032 NA NA
(0.3002) (0.3258)
Urban informal -0.1249 -0.025 -0.1422 -0.025 -1.2268 * -0.319
(0.1525) (0.1634) (0.506)
"Other rural" -0.2847 + -0.053 -0.1638 -0.027 -0.5985 -0.088
(0.1515) (0.1634) (0.3733)
Farm -0.5828 ** -0.144 -0.4793 * -0.102 -1.7888 ** -0.542
(0.1564) (0.1873) (0.5809)
E. Cape -0.0490 -0.009 0.0223 0.004 -0.1458 -0.022
(0.2048) (0.2445) (0.6576)
N. Cape 0.0056 0.001 0.0437 0.007 NA NA
(0.1973) (0.2207)
Free State -0.0564 -0.011 -0.1421 -0.025 -0.6282 -0.129
(0.2365) (0.2577) (0.6725)
KwaZulu Natal 0.1062 0.019 0.0596 0.009 1.2211 + 0.113
(0.2228) (0.2523) (0.6815)
North West -0.0531 -0.010 -0.0052 -0.001 NA NA
(0.2697) (0.2772)
Gauteng -0.2174 -0.044 -0.2483 -0.045 -0.8160 -0.172
(0.2223) (0.2349) (0.6085)
Mpumalanga 0.1257 0.022 0.0820 0.013 0.8379 0.071
(0.2333) (0.2562) (0.579)
Limpopo 0.4584 + 0.069 0.3961 0.053 0.4144 0.048
(0.2494) (0.2635) (0.8284)
Tranche 2: June -0.2521 + -0.050 -0.2884 + -0.050 -1.4454 ** -0.306
(0.1385) (0.1475) (0.478)
Tranche 3: October 0.0003 0.000 0.0041 0.001 0.8399 + 0.101
(0.1303) (0.1363) (0.467)
Tuesday -0.1308 -0.025 -0.1543 -0.026 -0.3240 -0.053
(0.1575) (0.1709) (0.3785)
Wednesday 0.0318 0.006 0.2801 0.040 1.0768 + 0.096
(0.1627) (0.1727) (0.5979)
Thursday 0.2081 0.035 0.2520 0.036 0.5676 0.062
(0.1694) (0.1747) (0.4319)
Friday -0.2105 -0.042 -0.1844 -0.032 -0.0822 -0.012
(0.1753) (0.1795) (0.4837)
Intercept -0.7950 -1.0423 3.4643
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Models (3) and (4): estimated over people age 20 and younger with incomplete education and classified as not 
economically active, describing a "typical" day during the school week (Monday to Friday)
gp y ( )
F(x=0) is reported. The means are calculated for the subpopulation (1). Age2 was set to the square of the 
mean age.
() p p g y g p ,
economically active who gave "schooling" as the reason for not being economically active, describing a 
"typical" day during the school week.
1.79
0.1281
g( p ) g
and stratification.
Models (1) and (2): estimated over people age 20 and younger with incomplete education, describing a 
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Estimates of  Post-Apartheid Changes in South African Poverty and Inequality to key 
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Rohleder, P. Gibson, K. 2005. “We are not fresh”: HIV-positive women talk of  
their experience of  living with their spoiled identity. Cape Town. CSSR Working 
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Fedderke, J. Kularatne, C. Mariotti, M. 2005. Mark-up Pricing in the South 
African Industry. Cape Town. CSSR Working Paper No. 111.
Irving, Margaret. 2005. Informal Savings Groups in South Africa: Investing in 
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The CSSR is an umbrella organisation comprising ﬁve units: 
The AIDS and Society Research Unit (ASRU) supports innovative research into 
the social dimensions of AIDS in South Africa. Special emphasis is placed on 
exploring  the  interface  between  qualitative  and  quantitative  research.  By 
forging creative links between academic research and outreach activities, 
we  hope  to  improve  our  understanding  of  the  relationship  between  AIDS 
and society and to make a difference to those living with AIDS. Focus areas 
include: AIDS-stigma, sexual relationships in the age of AIDS, the social and 
economic factors inﬂuencing disclosure (of HIV-status to others), the interface 
between traditional medicine and biomedicine, and the impact of providing 
antiretroviral treatment on individuals and households. 
The Data First Resource Unit (‘Data First’) provides training and resources for 
research.  Its main functions are: 1) to provide access to digital data resources 
and specialised published material; 2) to facilitate the collection, exchange 
and  use  of  data  sets  on  a  collaborative  basis;  3)  to  provide  basic  and 
advanced training in data analysis; 4) the ongoing development of a web site 
to disseminate data and research output.   
The Democracy in Africa Research Unit (DARU) supports students and scholars 
who conduct systematic research in the following three areas:  1) public opinion 
and political culture in Africa and its role in democratisation and consolidation; 
2) elections and voting in Africa; and 3) the impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic 
on democratisation in Southern Africa. DARU has developed close working 
relationships with projects such as the Afrobarometer (a cross national survey of 
public opinion in ﬁfteen African countries), the Comparative National Elections 
Project, and the Health Economics and AIDS Research Unit at the University of 
Natal.
The Social Surveys Unit (SSU) promotes critical analysis of the methodology, 
ethics and results of South African social science research. Our core activities 
include the overlapping Cape Area Study and Cape Area Panel Study. The 
Cape Area Study comprises a series of surveys of social, economic and political 
aspects of life in Cape Town. The Cape Area Panel Study is an ongoing study 
of 4800 young adults in Cape Town as they move from school into the worlds of 
work, unemployment, adulthood and parenthood.
The  Southern  Africa  Labour  and  Development  Research  Unit  (SALDRU)  was 
established in 1975 as part of the School of Economics and joined the CSSR 
in 2002.  In line with its historical contribution, SALDRU’s researchers continue 
to  conduct  research  detailing  changing  patterns  of  well-being  in  South 
Africa and assessing the impact of government policy on the poor. Current 
research work falls into the following research themes: post-apartheid poverty; 
employment and migration dynamics; family support structures in an era of 
rapid social change; the ﬁnancial strategies of the poor; public works and 
public infrastructure programmes; common property resources and the poor.